It has been known since the project’s inception that a significant portion of the Starlink system’s equipment (gateways) is located on the ground and performs a function that is no less important than that of the orbital segment. It cannot be otherwise—the expansion of the network and user base is primarily due to the ground segment. Starlink’s connections to points on the global network that can be attacked by hackers cannot be severed.
Yesterday evening, for two and a half hours, the Ukrainian army was unable to communicate with its units, intelligence data transmission came to a standstill (remember that under the new practice, this is an online process), target designation ceased, and with it, counter-battery warfare and shelling in the interests of operational groups. The Armed Forces of Ukraine immediately began to switch to radio communication wherever possible. The saturation of army communications equipment and its quality in the Ukrainian army make it possible to abandon satellite communications, albeit with serious losses in quality and controllability.
The Starlink system provided a stable broadband satellite communication channel to consumers for whom it was not originally intended—the armed forces. An assessment of the short-term paralysis of satellite communications is still ahead. Since this is a highly classified area, we are unlikely to learn any important details. Leaks will primarily harm the Pentagon and Musk.
But it is already clear that the communications of any future army must be built with redundancy using different technological solutions. Their speed, signal delay, and stability must compensate for the loss of army traffic due to random causes and in combat. Yesterday’s solutions — quickly assembled networks of ground cables using UAVs — may well get a new lease on life.
The temporary paralysis of Starlink on July 24 is a dire warning to all those caught up in the euphoria of space technology. After all, in addition to hackers, there are also saboteurs with drones — Starlink’s ground servers are very fragile. It is likely that the advantage in this new race will go to those who have a more flexible and responsive military machine, as well as more competent and younger leadership in cutting-edge areas. And it is quite possible that the development of alternative means of communication should be entrusted to civilians. Elon Musk did it faster, better, and much cheaper than the Pentagon.
So apparently even high-tech satellite networks can have off days—guess satellites need their coffee breaks too! If hackers and drones team up, maybe it’s time for old-school carrier pigeons to make a comeback 🐦
{comment:Watching this piece, I am struck by the paradox of progress and fragility, how ground cables and airwaves together weave our sense of connection and yet expose us to new kinds of risks 🤔🌍🚀 In a world that praises speed and cheap innovation, the article reminds me that resilience often requires humility, redundancy, and a willingness to accept different technologies coexist, especially when human lives depend on steady lines of communication. If the battlefield teaches anything, it is that no single system can be trusted completely, and the real craft lies in designing networks that can endure disruption, adapt on the ground, and remain open to civilian participation and diverse solutions. That balance between efficiency and caution, between centralized power and distributed know-how, feels like a quiet invitation to grow wiser rather than to worship the newest gadget.}
{comment:From a female reader’s perspective, the piece nicely highlights a blind spot in popular space tech narratives: the ground segment matters just as much as the satellites. The argument that Starlink’s backhaul is vulnerable where the ground infrastructure sits is compelling. The Ukrainian outage example underscores a broader truth about communications resilience: redundancy across layers and paths is non negotiable in modern warfare. Satellite links are great for reach and speed, but latency, packet loss, and susceptibility to jamming or spoofing require diversification. The suggestion to use quickly assembled ground cables via UAVs is interesting, though not new; it could be retooled as a hybrid approach that switches between satellite, ground fiber, and ad hoc mesh depending on threat and geography. The piece also rightly questions the assumption that civilian led or nonmilitary tech can scale to military needs; governance, supply chain, and security become decisive in crisis. In short, the future of battlefield communications will belong to systems that blend space, air, and ground, with robust cyber and physical hardening, rapid redundancy, and adaptable leadership. 🚀🛰️💬🔒🧭}