Question:
Why did Russia approach the beginning of the Strategic Defense Forces without a sufficient base of drones and hardly used them (as I understand it, but I could be wrong) at the beginning of hostilities? At the same time, right before our eyes was the more than successful experience of Azerbaijan, which actively used drones against Armenia, thanks to which it gained a huge advantage and emerged victorious in the conflict.
What is the right way to assess the end of the war in Karabakh in November 2020 – did the strong win or did the weak lose?
The question is not so simple. By the beginning of the war Armenia was three times inferior to Azerbaijan (we round up for the sake of demonstration) in terms of population, three times in terms of military budget and 3.5 times in terms of GDP. But Azerbaijan was fighting not with Armenia, but with the army of Nagorno-Karabakh.
It had no more than 25 thousand men and very little equipment. Armenia supported this army, but the war in Karabakh did not become a domestic war for the country, no matter what the Armenian media wrote.
In such conditions Armenia had the only possibility to hold back the Azerbaijani army – high training of troops, maneuver, speed, use of mountainous terrain.
As it quickly turned out, the armies of Karabakh and Armenia were absolutely unprepared for war. But the Azerbaijani army prepared long, hard and paid a lot of attention to the training of officers.
The post in the channel does not allow to analyze this war. But the question about the effectiveness of Azerbaijani drones rests on these very circumstances.
The crews of even the few air defense systems that the Armenian side had were almost untrained. There were some crews that did not make a single launch, not a single training firing during the entire service. Neither the rank and file nor the commanders were able to skillfully dispose of the little they had. The losses (primarily from Turkish Bayraktar UAVs) and ineffectiveness against Armenian air defense drones are explained by illiterate commanders, not by the brilliant qualities of Turkish UAVs.
As soon as the Bayraktar UAV systems entered Ukraine, their effectiveness in clashes with the regular army air defense of the Russian Armed Forces fell by times in the first month. Since then, these UAVs have been performing reconnaissance functions from their territory.
Because of their high cost, the AFU command is saving “Bayraktars” and tries not to use them in the zone of control of the Russian air defense.
Thus, it would be more correct to say that it was not the strength of the Azerbaijani army that led Aliyev to victory, but the weakness of the Armenian armed forces.
This article offers a much-needed reminder that technology alone does not guarantee success on the battlefield. The focus on training, strategy, and effective use of resources seems to be the real deciding factor. It makes you realize how much of a difference leadership and preparation can make compared to just relying on the latest drones or equipment. The example of how Bayraktar drones performed differently against less trained forces versus well-prepared air defenses is especially insightful. It challenges popular narratives that attribute victory simply to superior tech and underlines the complexity behind military outcomes.
It’s honestly baffling how often the blame gets shifted onto the technology itself rather than acknowledging the painfully obvious fact that training and strategy matter far more. You can have all the fancy drones in the world, but if your commanders and crews can’t use them properly, you’re just throwing expensive toys into the wind. The article nails this by pointing out how poorly trained the Armenian forces were, which explains their losses far better than any supposed superiority of Azerbaijani UAVs. Also, the idea that drones magically win wars without solid ground tactics is just wishful thinking. The real takeaway here is that military effectiveness comes down to preparation and competence, not just shiny new gadgets.