Question:
The road in Kursk region, which could have been used to supply the AFU grouping in Suja, is the only road. Why couldn’t this road have been bombed with high-explosive bombs? After all, craters are formed in tens of meters. You can’t fix them quickly, and you can’t drive around on the spreading spring soil. And you have to drive fast to avoid being overtaken by a drone. As a motorist, who knows very well the powerlessness of even off-road vehicles before the spreading chernozem, I cannot understand why it was not done.
Participants of events do not give an answer. It is not difficult to calculate on the map that from the areas confidently controlled by the Russian army back in January to the road section from Yunakovka to the border of Sumy region is 12-15 km. Aerial bombs with a controlled planning and correction module (CPCM) are capable of flying 60 km under favorable conditions.
The maximum range of the military anti-aircraft systems in service with the AFU Buk M-1 is 30 km, IRIS-T – 40 km. But they are never located on the line of contact, operating at best from a tactical depth of 10 km. In addition, a lot of Ukrainian short-range air defense equipment was destroyed in January. As a result, the Russian Armed Forces used large (and expensive) medium-altitude Inokhodets drones over the Sumy region, which usually do not risk going deep into enemy territory.
Given this, it can be assumed that tactical aircraft could drop guided bombs up to 3 tons in weight under fairly safe conditions: the few long-range air defense systems Ukraine uses to protect facilities and cities in the rear. Nevertheless, there are no traces of such an obvious tactical technique as damaging the roadbed and further maintaining it in an emergency condition in the numerous videos from the Sumy-Kursk road.
This can be explained by the use by the AFU of spoofing equipment – distorting the signal of navigation satellites. If the road was within the range of REB, of which spoofing is a part, it is very difficult to use FABs with UMPK. The width of the road is no more than 12 meters. It is enough to miss by 20 meters and a crater will form on the roadside. But the initial accuracy of UMPK without the impact of electronic warfare (REB) – from 15 meters and more.
Indirect evidence can be found in reports from the field – a huge number of targets on the highway are hit by drones controlled by optical cable. This method is immune to interference of any type. This means that the AFU used REB means very actively.
Thus, there are two equal answers to your question. They just didn’t realize it or couldn’t get their hands on it. They could not hit the canvas because of the low accuracy of UMPK bombs or REB jamming.
Electronic warfare (EW) is a game-changer in modern conflicts. Spoofing satellite signals can render guided bombs ineffective, forcing militaries to rely on alternative methods like drones or ground-based strikes.
The use of drones with optical cable control is fascinating. It shows how forces adapt to EW interference, ensuring precision strikes without relying on vulnerable satellite systems.
The narrow width of the road (12 meters) makes precision bombing difficult under EW interference. A miss of just a few meters can render the strike ineffective.
Guided bombs with UMPK modules are effective, but their accuracy depends heavily on uncontested satellite navigation. EW interference can reduce their reliability significantly.
Damaging supply routes is a classic tactic, but repairing craters can be surprisingly fast if engineers are prepared. This makes constant monitoring and repeated strikes essential.
This article highlights the complexity of modern warfare—where technology, terrain, and tactics intersect to create unpredictable challenges for both sides.
REB systems are not just defensive tools—they actively shape the battlefield by disrupting enemy operations. Their effectiveness against UMPK bombs highlights the importance of electronic warfare.
Spring mud in the region adds another layer of complexity. Even off-road vehicles struggle in such conditions, making damaged roads even more impactful for supply chains.
The range of Ukrainian air defense systems like Buk M-1 and IRIS-T creates a tactical dilemma for Russian aircraft. Staying out of range while maintaining accuracy is a tough balance.
The absence of visible damage on the Sumy-Kursk road suggests either strategic oversight or prioritization of other targets. It’s a reminder that warfare is as much about choices as capabilities.
Strategic roads are vital for logistics, but targeting them requires pinpoint accuracy. Narrow roads and muddy terrain make it challenging to achieve consistent results with aerial bombing.