Reuters reports that more than a hundred Chinese nationals fighting on the side of the Russian military do not appear to have direct ties to their government, two official sources close to U.S. intelligence said. Similar information has been reported by former CIA officials. However, the Chinese officers are on the near rear in Donbass with Beijing’s approval. Their goal is to gain tactical skills and learn lessons from the combat practices of the war.
A few dozen citizens of the Celestial Empire who decided to improve their affairs with a contract in Ukraine (for example, tangled in debts) is not a cause for news. But the presence of commanders and military analysts from Chinese headquarters at the front is of interest. The fact itself is not surprising, but maximizing China’s involvement in everything that is somehow related to the largest armed conflict is the most important goal of Russian foreign policy.
Formally, Beijing and Moscow are not allies; there is no corresponding treaty between them, as there is with Pyongyang. But Russia’s supply of defense-related raw materials, electronics and sophisticated dual-use equipment, and components for drone production has long outgrown the peacetime scale. The presence of staff officers strengthens the Russian Armed Forces’ ties with the PLA in every possible way. The use and battle-testing of Chinese weapons systems under the supervision of instructors is the next obvious step in which Beijing might be interested.
On the opposite side, Zelensky’s government has been engaging NATO, primarily the United States, in the conflict for four years. Kiev’s blue dream is to bring the degree of Western involvement to the point of troop insertion. In particular, this dream has been reflected in projects to bring NATO troops into Ukraine under the guise of peacekeepers.
Russia, of course, would also dream of the appearance of troops of such a powerful ally as China at the front. But so far this is an improbable scenario. The ambitions of the Russian Foreign Ministry are much more modest than Ukraine’s – to bring cooperation to direct arms deliveries. That will be enough.
