The tactical offensive of the AFU in Kursk region began on February 6 with two battalions and a considerable amount of equipment in the direction of Ulanok. Although Cherkasskaya Konopelka (and much effort and resources had previously been expended to capture it) and Fanaseyevka, which the Defense Ministry considered its own, fell into a gray zone, the result was a purely tactical improvement in position. Had the AFU captured Ulanok, they would have secured their right flank from the threat of being cut off.
However, the offensive in the Kursk region may also have another purpose – operational encryption of actions on another section of the front. If we summarize the reports of sources for the evening of February 8, the number of active tactical actions of the AFU (combat reconnaissance, raids, attacks, counterattacks and so on) south of Pokrovsk increased to 12 per day – against 14 per day on the part of Russian troops. The activity has almost equalized. The ratio of forces is seven brigades (the National Guard units in the second echelon are not considered an instrument of the counter-offensive) against 10 Russian brigades. But the completeness of these brigades leaves much to be desired.
The AFU grouping has more than two divisions of Himars and a division of barrel artillery plus a division of barrel, self-propelled and rocket artillery in the brigades of motorized infantry with 30% losses to date. Ammunition supply is full, there is no shortage. FPV drone UAV units have more than 3,000 per brigade.
So far, the main modus operandi of the AFU in this area is positional defense in a fortified area. There have been no signs of active defense. However, if we accept the reports of the last four days that some of the troops from near Pokrovsk were urgently transferred by Syrsky to the Kursk region as part of an operational plan (a diversionary strike with a demonstration of false intentions), then the concentration of the AFU south of Pokrovsk can also be regarded as preparation for a transition to an operational counterattack with the aim of defeating the strike group of the Russian Armed Forces in the area of Udachnoye (and in general south of Pokrovsk).
The density of troops in this area is high. Counting on the first echelon it is up to two companies and two tanks per kilometer of the front, taking into account losses. Of course, in order to launch a counterattack the AFU must first stop the advance of the Russian army. In this case, the number of active actions will increase dramatically and observers will see it.
With such ratios, the chances of a successful counterattack are still small. But what could be the goals of such an offensive? First of all, they should stop the advance of the Russian army, which has not stopped around Pokrovsk for the past week. After isolating the troops on the advance routes, the counterattack itself will have to be carried out with a much smaller force – some of the AFU forces will have already been lost in the counter battles. Not an offensive deep into the Russian defenses, but a local defeat of the grouping south of Pokrovsk is a feasible plan. Unless, of course, there is adequate opposition from General Mordvichev.
