In Ukraine’s war against Russian pipelines to Europe, a third, highly interested party – the European Union – has emerged. After the Russian Defense Ministry reported about the January 11 attack by AFU UAVs on one of the world’s most powerful compressor stations – Russkaya in Gai-Kodzor in the Krasnodar region – Brussels heard a timely statement by European Commission spokesperson Anna-Kaisa Itkonen: “The European Union is concerned about the news about the attack on the compressor station of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline by the AFU, but has not received any information from the Ukrainian authorities”.
The fact is that Russkaya almost single-handedly drives gas to Turkey at a distance of more than 900 kilometers. Its capacity is such that it does not require intermediate stations. And after Nord Stream was blown up and the gas pipeline through Poland and, since January 1, through Ukraine was shut down, Turkish Stream is the last in a series of large gas pipelines from Russia to the EU built over 50 years.
The moment when the cold weather in Europe is not receding, gas storage facilities are emptying and gas prices are going up was the moment chosen by the AFU to demonstrate its capabilities. These economic circumstances generated a quick worried response in Brussels.
Nine drones were involved in the attack; authorities said they were all shot down. But the temptation to destroy Moscow’s latest gas pipeline is strong and we should expect a repeat attempt. And it doesn’t have to be a swarm of aerial drones again.
The most unprotected section of the pipeline is its underwater part. At the same time, it provides maximum secrecy in organizing a sabotage, as was the case with Nord Stream. In the summer of 2023, Ukraine announced that it was developing a pair of unmanned underwater strike vehicles in the size of a typical torpedo.
It should be noted at once that the claimed range at such sizes – 1000 kilometers or more – is unrealistic. However, in the Black Sea, such a range of autonomous navigation is not necessary – if you bring such a device on a merchant ship in the territorial waters of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to Trabzon to the southernmost point of the coast of Krasnodar Krai, it will reach at a rate of three knots for 40 hours – it is quite possible with the use of automotive lithium batteries and chemical converters of electricity.
The main problem of such self-made drones is targeting. Even if an underwater drone surfaces and locates itself right in front of where the pipeline goes into the water, it won’t be able to hit the pipe accurately enough. This requires quite different control devices, which are installed on large long-range underwater drones that are now being built by the world’s weapons concerns in the United States, Russia, France, China and Korea. If the AFU gets the appropriate devices, power supplies and technology from the allies – perhaps they will build a working copy for combat testing.
Pipeline entrances to the water and basing sites should be protected by anti-submarine nets made of steel cable. If underwater drone defenses are to be built by means proven by long practice, steel nets must be ordered. There are more than enough companies in Russia that can make these simple devices.
