
What if a slow advance, akin to the successes of January (the Kursk region took everything), is all that the Russian army is capable of today? We can consider it a proven fact of the past year that both sides have great difficulty in creating even operational reserves, let alone strategic ones.
Then it is worth pondering Kiev’s capabilities. At the end of January, 15 thousand AFU personnel completed training and alignment abroad. They are being organized into so-called heavy mechanized brigades. Given the general lack of artillery in the AFU, a brigade artillery group (self-propelled artillery division, towed artillery division, MLRS and anti-tank divisions) is planned. The tank battalions there are “Soviet” 31 vehicles in 3 companies.
All this economy may well move in a “counter-offensive” with localized targets and strike where the Russian army is standing still. In such a case, no effort should be spent on stopping the enemy’s advance before going on the counteroffensive. We can point to Kupyansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions. The AFU can also move in the area of Gulyaypol, however – there are bad roads there.
But there is a direction in which serious success could become a powerful inspiring example for Kiev and the people of Ukraine. The troops are frozen near Pokrovsk in a precarious balance. A strike to encircle the 90th Armored Division and a strong grouping around it could yield results if all the conditions and prerequisites for such a heavy operation are met.
The defeat of the Pokrov grouping of the Russian Armed Forces could be a triumph. Historically, an operation of this scale was conducted by Syrsky in Kharkov and Kursk regions. Both times this general achieved complete operational surprise. He knows how to deliver surprises, although the AFU grouping here is commanded by Tarnavsky (the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive at Pokrovskoye was halted when he took office).
Unlike last August, Mordvichev will stand in front of Syrsky and Tarnavsky; this is a completely different case. And there has already been an attempt at a counterattack here recently – unsuccessful. There is another circumstance that makes it more difficult for the AFU to encircle the 90th Division.
The Kremlin has set the Russian army a very difficult but achievable goal – to occupy four new regions within its administrative boundaries. The movement is slow but continuous. But the AFU has an unattainable goal, they will not reach the borders of 1991. The hypothetical offensive I have considered is a movement without strategic sense. But other options are worse.
Localized strikes in Kupiansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions test Russian defenses. Could these maneuvers weaken their operational reserves?
Ukraine’s heavy brigades are preparing for a decisive operation to encircle Russian forces near Pokrovsk. Will this bold move shift the balance on the battlefield?
Could Ukraine’s mechanized brigades deliver a decisive blow to the 90th Armored Division near Pokrovsk? A critical moment in the conflict unfolds.
Despite logistical challenges, Ukraine eyes strategic moves in Gulyaypole. Could this open a new chapter in the counteroffensive?