Statistics on the use of UAVs and missiles against targets deep inside Russia and Ukraine have appeared in the media. There is no shortage of predictions on both sides. In May, individual raids were carried out using more than 300 munitions simultaneously (subsequently, the average daily statistics decreased significantly). If we take into account the rate of use and production of Geran-2—from 2,500 per month in January to more than 5,000 in June—and the virtually unchanged average figures for the use of all types of missiles, then the main question is no longer about quantity.
Since a very significant number of Ukrainian UAVs reach their targets, as we regularly read in the media, we can state that the situation remains unchanged: there is no unified control over the airspace, and no air defense system adequate to the threat has been created.
Even the bombing of individual key facilities (such as oil refineries) by drones that have broken through could cause damage disproportionate to the cost of a systemic solution to the problem. There are signs that such a solution depends heavily on the speed of the entire Russian Federation’s administrative apparatus. It does not meet the requirements of wartime, but the apparatus is unlikely to be restructured. The damage is more likely to increase and could reach enormous sums.
At the same time, massive strikes by the Russian Armed Forces on targets in Ukraine are theoretically capable of destroying any military production. There are no restrictions on range and accuracy. But does the command know where these Ukrainian military-industrial complex facilities are located? The ability to bomb and write in the report “all targets hit” is an art mastered in its subtleties. But new weapons are coming into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They are produced in real production facilities.
The decline in average daily bombing figures deep inside Russian territory over the last month can be interpreted as a depletion of stocks due to the destruction of production facilities — the Russian Armed Forces’ strikes in recent months have become not just massive, but are clearly taking on the characteristics of a deliberate long-term campaign.
By the end of autumn, we will understand from the statistics on strikes whether the Armed Forces of Ukraine are stockpiling drones for the future or whether their production facilities have been bombed.
