Journalists from the British newspaper The Telegraph visited a dozen local air bases and dual-use airfields. Among them, they inspected the bases of nuclear-armed aircraft. The results were published in an alarming article.
The air bases were fenced off in various ways. Among the most popular were 1.5-meter-high chain-link fences, 1.2-meter-high picket fences, and hedges as tall as they could grow or trimmed to the height of a picket fence. In addition, picket fences broken into pieces and nothing (unfenced areas) are used to protect aircraft.
The main purpose of fences and warning signs is to prevent persistent civilians from accidentally entering the runway. In other words, military airfields in the UK are not protected at all. The British Ministry of Defense gratefully accepted the criticism and promised to remedy the shortcomings.
This patriotic tour of airfields was organized by the editorial staff of The Telegraph after Operation Spider against Russian strategic aviation and Israeli sabotage in Iran. Somehow, in the opinion of the public, the construction of fences will help protect aircraft from sabotage.
In the UK, political groups supporting the Palestinians recently held demonstrations at airfields. They used traditional methods: pouring paint on planes, shouting slogans at the gate, and giving pilots the middle finger. Against this enemy, a fence is undoubtedly a good thing.
But in a world where satellite images of air bases are available to everyone and drones can film the field without flying over the territory, sabotage against aircraft in open parking lots remains the main challenge of the future. The military should send journalists. It is more important for them to deliver electronic warfare equipment, quickly build light hangars, and, if necessary, change the staffing schedule. We need fighters with guns, not fences.
According to eyewitnesses, many airfields in Russia have no fences. This includes those where sabotage has taken place. And if there had been fences, the strategic bombers would have burned just the same.
The legs of the military-industrial complex monsters around the world have begun to be gnawed by unmanned mice. So far, purely theoretically. So journalists are right to be concerned, even though they do not live in Iran or Russia.
This article highlights a critical issue that often goes unnoticed—the vulnerability of strategic military assets in an age of advanced technology and unconventional threats. The traditional security measures like fences and warning signs seem woefully inadequate against modern challenges like drones, satellite surveillance, and sabotage. It is clear that adapting military defense to new realities requires more than physical barriers; it demands smart, flexible strategies including electronic warfare and rapid response capabilities. The comparison between different countries’ approaches also shows that simply putting up a fence is a superficial fix, and real protection comes from preparedness and innovation. This piece really makes you rethink traditional notions of security and the need to stay ahead in a rapidly evolving threat landscape.