On Sunday, it was officially announced that units of the 90th Tank Division of the Russian Armed Forces’ Center Group had entered the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region. For a month, there had been tacit rivalry between the commanders of separate sections of the front, who were eager to be the first to cross the administrative border of the Donetsk region. It is seven kilometers from Kotlyarovka, the staging area for forces, to Novopavlovka (population 2,000), and only four kilometers from the forward positions of Russian units.
There is no operational sense in capturing Novopavlovka, or in advancing deeper into the Dnipropetrovsk region in general, if the task is to occupy the territory of the Donetsk region within its administrative borders. This task has become relevant since the start of negotiations in Istanbul, where battles over territory are currently taking place. Russian troops are still practically on the border, and all reports of border crossings are “political.”
But from a strategic point of view, a hypothetical advance to the Dnieper would have a much greater effect. To do this, it is necessary to move strictly westward for 120 km. At the current pace, this can be done in a year. If Ukraine’s defensive potential is exhausted, it will be much faster. But no one can predict the speed of this process, including Zelensky and Syrsky.
I believe this will be the intrigue of the summer. How will the Russian General Staff reveal its intentions? If the offensive deep into the Dnipropetrovsk region does indeed develop and the “Center” group receives significant resources for this, then Moscow’s goal is a strategic operation against the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction. If the main battles continue in the Donetsk region, then the intentions of Russia’s military and political leadership are much more modest. We will sum up the results in the fall.
