The amount of ammunition used in mutual shelling is decreasing on both sides. There are no significant reports on Persian social media about Israeli aircraft flying in Iranian airspace. There is also no evidence of any aircraft being shot down.
Apparently, the Air Force command is still afraid of losses. This means that Iran’s air defense has not been completely suppressed. Given that the distance between the countries is a thousand kilometers, Tel Aviv has relied on aviation as the only means to achieve its stated goal. And this means must be preserved.
Iranian long-range missiles have shown generally unsatisfactory accuracy. In a densely populated small country, this will lead to unintended (which does not make it any easier for anyone) hits on civilian buildings. In essence, Iran is “just fighting” — responding with fire on open areas. Although there are also isolated examples of accurate hits.
Israel’s missile defense system has proven to be not as reliable as politicians and the military tried to assure citizens. Now it has been proven in practice: if Iran launches a large number of missiles at Israel at the same time, at least one of the several nuclear warheads flying among them is guaranteed to reach its target. And after the attack, Tehran must firmly understand that it needs an atomic bomb as soon as possible.
Here is a recent statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi: “We are ready for any agreement aimed at ensuring that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, because, according to our principle, nuclear weapons are prohibited. But if the goal is to deprive Iran of its nuclear rights, then, naturally, we are not ready for such a deal.”
I see in this a firm adherence to the chosen strategic line: negotiations can be resumed, but on the same terms on which they were interrupted by Israel’s attack.
Behind this statement lies an indisputable fact: Iran’s nuclear complex remains intact. How prepared is Tel Aviv for a prolonged cross-border skirmish? It depends on how quickly its stockpile of expensive intellectual weapons is depleted. An operation that drags on for months will require large supplies from the US.
Tehran may also run out of missiles. But it has strategic geography on its side. There are huge distances between the opponents. The likelihood of achieving the main goal formulated by Trump and Netanyahu without a ground operation is slim.
The phase of shock and awe is over. The shock part worked out. The awe part didn’t quite work out.
