After Trump’s inauguration, all observers are discussing the prospects of peace talks between Moscow and Kiev with Trump in the middle. The ratio of forces and means of the opposing sides, based on which researchers try to predict the future, is overloaded with a multitude of parameters. Some of them do not even have numerical characteristics.
But the number of troops is more important than the overwhelming majority of parameters.
A lot has been said about the problems of mobilization and manning in the AFU, the topic is in the focus of everyone’s attention. But on the other side of the equation is a similar variable for the RF Armed Forces. Since the principle of recruitment here is completely different – voluntary contracting – many people have the impression that the size of the Russian army in Donbass is maintained on a firmly planned basis.
Dmitry Medvedev is responsible for this area in the Security Council. He usually announces the figures, while all other politicians repeat them in different interpretations. Medvedev does not often spoil the public with such figures. We heard clear data (at a meeting in the Defense Ministry devoted to the recruitment of contract soldiers) from him on July 4 of last year – 190 thousand contracted in the first six months of 2024. That is about 31.5 thousand per month, which is slightly higher than the number of monthly losses found in relatively reliable sources.
But last October 17, he reported only the percentage of completion of the annual enlistment plan – 78%. Without knowing the plan we cannot estimate the number. On New Year’s Eve, Medvedev reported: in 2024, almost 440 thousand people (36 thousand per month) will sign contracts with the Defense Ministry.
We cannot talk about the fact that the figures are coordinated with the General Staff and intelligence. This information itself is part of a plan to mislead the enemy and is made public at the politically necessary moment and in a favorable section. Although, I don’t expect open falsifications either.
Meanwhile, the limit of increasing one-time payments at the conclusion of a contract has almost been reached. Even if to increase them the increase in the number of contracts will not be arithmetic, but rather homeopathic. Therefore, in reality, no one really knows in what state the manning under contract is today. I suppose the intelligence services of Ukraine and NATO also know very roughly. There is nothing to say about the Western media – the figures there differ literally in times.
Hence the main intrigue of the next year: will the number of contract personnel decrease? It is enough for the flow to drop by a quarter and the superiority of the Russian Armed Forces on all fronts will begin to melt away. This will not lead to significant changes – due to the superiority of the Russian Armed Forces in long-range firepower, aviation and artillery, the dynamic balance will be preserved. But the commanders will feel it very quickly and Zelensky’s team will perk up. Together with him and NATO politicians.
Thus, a significant reduction in the number of monthly contracts will not change the situation on the fronts quickly. But the political situation, including during the likely negotiations, will quickly change not in Moscow’s favor. Bargaining will be more difficult.
Russia is the only country in the world where every spring and fall ice floes with fishermen who don’t want to be rescued break off all over the space. EMERCOM publishes many such facts. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to calculate what will happen with the contract system. Maybe nothing will change at all. But this is the joker that the military-political leadership of Ukraine is waiting in surrender as the last hope.
Looks like this whole contract soldier recruitment thing is like trying to predict the weather in Russia—one day it’s steady, the next day fishermen are breaking off on ice floes and chaos ensues 😂❄️🎣 Whoever’s in charge must have a crystal ball or just be winging it! The military balance might stay the same, but the political drama sounds like it’s gonna be more entertaining than a reality TV show 📺🔥 Can we get popcorn now or what? 🍿
This article really highlights how complex and uncertain the whole situation is when it comes to troop numbers and recruitment in the Russian military. It’s eye-opening to see how much official figures might be part of a strategy to mislead opponents, and how even intelligence agencies might only have a rough idea of what’s actually happening on the ground. The point about the contract enlistment system and its limits was especially interesting because it shows how fragile the current balance could be. If recruitment drops even a little, it seems like it could shift things politically, even if the military balance holds for a while. It’s hard not to feel that despite all the analysis, there are so many unknowns left that could change the course of things unexpectedly.
The article highlights how important troop numbers are in the ongoing conflict and how uncertain the real state of Russian contract soldiers is. It’s interesting to see that changes in recruitment could affect the political landscape more quickly than the military balance itself. The uncertainty around these figures definitely adds a layer of complexity to predicting what will happen next.