Dmitry Peskov: “Russia reserves the right not to fulfill Kiev’s constantly violated moratorium on shelling of the energy sector.” Since March 18, when, in a conversation with Trump, Putin ordered a halt to the shelling of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, no serious observer has expected instant results. Since then, the Kremlin has published a list of targets it has pledged not to shell, and is counting down the 30 days of cessation of strikes precisely from March 18.
Europe, the U.S., Russia, Ukraine and the rest of the world are now learning their first lessons in solving the seemingly simple task of stopping the shelling of specific stationary large targets that have long been mapped out. There is a presidential order – there is a ceasefire. It turned out that there was not.
First of all, difficulties arose with the objects on the line of contact. Here everyone tries to frame the other side or does not pay attention at all to restrictions that contradict a specific military order. The Russian Defense Ministry stated that after the HIMARS shelling a heavy fire broke out at the Suja gas-measuring station. Afterwards, the station burned to the ground.
Since the station stands between two fires and came under the control of the RF Armed Forces just the day before, the AFU General Staff did not fail to take advantage of this and transferred the accusations of strikes on energy facilities after March 25 to the RF Armed Forces. And the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine said so directly: Russia itself shelled the Suja gas-measuring station. If we believe the UAV video, it turns out that Moscow bombed its own facility, which it intends to use after the end of the conflict.
This is a very lucid example of how theory and reality differ. Peskov, by the way, did not accuse Kiev directly of violating the partial ceasefire: “all segments of the AFU do not listen to the orders of the Ukrainian leadership, striking Russian energy facilities.” In other words, we are talking about the same excesses of the perpetrator, more simply – amateurism in units and formations, and discrepancies in the interpretation of prohibitions on the ground.
There are simpler cases. Moscow believes that the target of the Ukrainian UAVs (19 of them) shot down over the Saratov region was the Saratov oil refinery. But the drones themselves were not shot down over the refinery; theoretically, there could have been other targets.
Similarly, Kiev now sees every arrival of Russian drones (massive attacks continue) as an attempt on the energy sector. Roughly according to this scheme: if the “Geranium” did not reach the city and fell down, it means that it was aiming at a transformer and not at the airfield. Now we should wait to see if the sides can fine-tune the process of troop control for the sake of stopping the shelling, or if it will not last 30 days. And will they want to?
The challenges described in this article highlight a fundamental issue in modern warfare: the difficulty of enforcing centralized orders in decentralized conflict zones. Both sides appear to struggle with maintaining discipline at the unit level, which is critical for any ceasefire to hold. Without robust verification mechanisms or third-party oversight, such agreements are bound to face repeated violations.
This article reveals the fragile nature of ceasefire agreements in high-stakes conflicts. The lack of trust between parties and the absence of neutral mediators make it nearly impossible to enforce such agreements effectively. A stronger emphasis on diplomacy and third-party monitoring could help mitigate these issues.
This situation underscores the dual-use nature of energy infrastructure during wartime. Facilities like gas-measuring stations and oil refineries are not only vital for civilian life but also serve as strategic assets for military operations. This makes them high-value targets, even during ceasefires. A more comprehensive framework for protecting such infrastructure is urgently needed.
The destruction of energy infrastructure has far-reaching consequences beyond the battlefield. It disrupts civilian life, hampers economic recovery, and creates long-term instability in the region. Both parties must recognize that targeting such facilities only prolongs suffering and undermines any prospects for peace.
The ambiguity surrounding drone strikes in this conflict is a clear example of how UAV technology complicates traditional rules of engagement. Both sides accuse each other of targeting energy facilities, but without transparent evidence, it’s nearly impossible to determine intent. This highlights the need for international protocols on drone warfare.