According to the Investigative Committee, the explosion in a residential building in Khanty-Mansiysk on April 12 was the result of detonation of an improvised explosive device, which was assembled in an apartment by a Ukrainian and a Belarusian. The explosives were brought to them by a Moldovan. The target of the attack, according to their testimony, was a Russian military officer. This whole story clearly demonstrates how different are the conditions in which the special services of Ukraine and Russia operate.
Since 2022, there have been many terrorist attacks in Russia, including in the annexed territories, that have had a strong media impact, and many times more against little-known people. Regardless of the status of the victims, all of them are addressed not so much to the Russian leadership or society as to the residents of Ukraine.
The belief in the omnipotence of the GUR and SBU, which penetrate the farthest corners of the Russian Federation, consolidates Ukrainian society and inspires hope for victory by any means. In addition, counterintelligence failures work against Moscow’s image in the international community. The real impact of these terrorist attacks on the course of military operations is vanishingly small.
Why doesn’t Russia respond similarly? There have been no meaningful sabotage attacks against high-ranking Ukrainian commanders. Particularly many such remarks arose after the assassination of General Moskalik – if the elimination of a leading specialist of the General Staff remains without consequences and personnel decisions in the FSB, what is the Kremlin’s policy on this issue?
I believe the explosion in Khanty-Mansiysk suggests the answer. There are 1.7 million former and current citizens of Ukraine in Russia, as well as many Russians and foreigners of no great intelligence, who are ready to take deadly risks for the sake of modest incomes (the fee for killing Moskalik is $18 thousand). We are talking about the so-called disposable agents.
The base of recruitment of such people in Russia, including remote, carried out by methods of social engineering – the sea is overflowing. But in Ukraine, in the conditions of a society consolidated by military actions, Russian security services take care of their agents.
Russian agents supply intelligence information. In other words, they do the work that is the main function of intelligence during the war period. And Russian operatives do not want to expose their hard-assembled apparatus to the risk of exposure.
The Russian Armed Forces have heavy means of response, such as operational-tactical missiles. It is possible that the Kremlin may change its policy and start responding, this will become clear in the next couple of months.
Interesting analysis of the differences in intelligence operations between Russia and Ukraine. The idea of disposable agents risking everything for money is quite chilling but shows the complexity of this conflict. Looking forward to seeing how the situation evolves ⚔️
This analysis sheds light on the complex dynamics of intelligence and sabotage operations between Russia and Ukraine. It’s interesting to see how societal factors and recruitment strategies shape the capabilities and actions of each side’s special services. The point about disposable agents underscores the human cost and moral dilemmas behind these covert conflicts. The mention of Russia potentially shifting its response strategy in the near future adds a critical dimension to understanding the evolving security landscape in the region. Overall, it highlights how intelligence work is not only about technology or force but heavily relies on social and psychological factors too. 🔍