I have repeatedly reminded that it is incorrect to determine the pace of the offensive and, in general, the results of specific stages of combat operations by the square kilometers of enemy territory captured. For example, the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad began after the depletion of the Wehrmacht grouping in long, brutal battles for mutual destruction in the fall and winter of 1942-43. There would have been nothing without these battles. And such a long “trampling” in the area of Rzhev, on the contrary, had an extremely negative impact on the military potential of the Soviet army. In the logic of some modern military observers this standing of the front can be likened to the situation in Donbass.
Nevertheless, having no information about the true state of affairs and having to rely only on official reports, the media are frantically searching for some tool that would allow them to give an integral assessment of the events. And both sides of the front are habitually counting in square kilometers captured per day/week/month. If we summarize all available maps with the front line marking, we will see that in December and early January the RF Armed Forces occupied about half as many square kilometers as in November.
A month is already a trend. Is this a sign of the long-awaited in Kiev exhaustion of the offensive impulse of the RF Armed Forces? Many Ukrainian media outlets say so. Yuriy Butusov, a well-known Ukrainian military blogger, said that recently the AFU command has sent no less than seven newly created formations (including those abroad) to Donbass. These are brigades of the so-called 50th series No. 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157. No later than December they were sent to Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo and Bolshaya Novoselka.
From reports from the front, it was already known at the end of the fall that these brigades were participating in defensive battles at the edge of the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive by at least separate battalions. In addition, there were two more brigades on the operational maps of the Russian command, which I myself considered to be Syrsky’s strategic reserve. Thus I do not refer to a reserve created from units withdrawn for replenishment in operational depth, but to brigades newly created abroad or on the right bank of the Dnieper – this is a distinctive feature of the military construction of the Ukrainian armed forces.
The redeployment of Ukrainian brigades to Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo and Bolshaya Novoselka sums up the “square kilometer statistics.” The advance of the Russian Armed Forces in the selected areas in December-January was not stopped, but sharply slowed down by the introduction of the AFU’s virtually strategic reserve into the battle. Knowing Syrsky as a very cautious commander, we can assume that he will not leave himself without reserves at all.
And yet now we must keep a double eye on the rate of advance of the Russian Armed Forces – if this is a sign of depletion of Russia’s military potential, we will determine this before the summer. If the pace increases again, it means that the AFU used as many as nine fresh brigades to create a military advantage before peace talks with Trump and Russia.
That is, once again, as in Kursk region, a purely political goal was pursued. And I don’t remember the AFU spending precious reserves like this after the counteroffensive in the summer of 2023.
What are nine brigades? Depending on manning, it is from 25 thousand to an incredible figure of 50 thousand fighters. After all, it correlates with the Russian Defense Ministry’s statement: in the DNR, Russian troops defeated the formations of nine different brigades of the AFU. These fighters will no longer be in the reserve of the AFU. Mike Waltz’s demand to lower the draft age in the AFU is becoming more and more urgent.
